Suicide, Second Life, Modes of Seeing, & Superposition – An Application of Schrödinger’s Cat

If it’d mean that I could be like you,

then I’d happily die.

I see myself as living a second life. I could have died back then. Arguably, I did die back then; and, now, I’m somehow alive.

I’m a little different from back when.

I want to live.

Does my living coincide with the silencing of who I was before?

I don’t want to live if that coincides with silencing the person I was back when. Even if that person made a whole bunch of mistakes; even if that person did all sorts of bad things and thought all sorts of horrible thoughts; even if that person is a kind of person that I don’t ever want to be again–I’d want them to be able to be heard.

I’ve thought that I am who I am today only because I’ve been a kind of person that I find disgusting. Now, I’d say that I am who I am today because friends and acquaintances gave me feedback on the type of person I am, either directly or indirectly. As I received feedback from others, I was compelled to think about the kind of person I am. I’m thankful towards those who expressed their thoughts to me; and thankful towards those who were who they were–and, perhaps, are now.

These thoughts bring me to the question of

is it wrong to try and see myself as different from who I was back when?

and the question of

is it possible for a friend to currently be the same as the person they were back when?

Answers to the above questions seem to involve superposition. It’s both right and wrong to try and see myself as different from who I’ve been, and it’s both possible and impossible for a friend to currently be the same as the person they were.

If I were to see myself as different from who I was back when, it could mean one of two [or more] things. One thing it could mean is that I want to be able to say that the person I am now is a different person from who I was back when. Another thing it could mean is that I want to be able to say that I have developed as a person. While these two ideas may be nearly synonymous in some cases, I am apt to note that language is important here, and that these two ideas are very distinct from one another in this case.

To say “I am a different person” would imply that there are an infinite number of me, equal to the number of moments that have arisen within the timeframe of March 3rd, 1997 and March 14th, 2021. In this case, the me who exists in this moment, the me who existed a moment ago, the me who existed two moments ago, the me who existed three moments ago; and so forth–are all different people. On one hand, if this were true, then it might logical to conclude that the me that exists in this moment is not responsible for any deeds that me’s in past moments performed, and I would be apt to be seen as completely innocent in the scenario where I committed a crime during a past moment. On another hand, it might be logical to conclude that I should always consider myself as someone who has dependents when filing taxes, since I am obligated–by something more valuable than blood relations–to take responsibility for and look after each individual me that existed in past moments; it’s not like I could just abandon the me’s that existed in past moments.